Abstract-We introduce an approach of automatically identifying attacks by insider agents on dataflow-based processes having a collection-oriented data model and then improving the processes to prevent the attacks against them. Some process data, if used by some agents via steps at certain points of timeline, will lead to a privacy attack. A manual identification of these vulnerable data and rogue agents is quite tedious; thus, our approach automatically performs these identifications. We model a process and an attack based on a directed acyclic graph, with steps, reading and writing data, and controlled by agents. Then, we perform a declarative implementation to find out if this attack model can be mapped onto the process model based on some similarity criteria. If these criteria are met, we conclude that the attack model is "similar enough" to the process model to be successfully realized through it. Each possible way of mapping shows an avenue of attack on the process. Agent collusion scenarios are also identified. Finally, our approach automatically identifies process improvement opportunities and iteratively exploits them, thereby eliminating attack avenues.
Insider Attack Identification and Prevention inI. INTRODUCTION

D
ETERMINING if an attack can take place on large realworld processes is not trivial. In elections, vulnerability analyses [1] , [2] have focused on security or privacy aspects of specific parts of a process. However, few have conducted a holistic vulnerability analysis, investigating the interactions among the steps, data, and agents in a process [3] , [4] .
We present such a holistic vulnerability analysis approach, i.e., data interaction with agents and steps (DIAS). Section II introduces a motivating election process example. Section III presents a high-level overview of DIAS. There are agents controlling steps that do not read some data but have the capability (can read) to do so. If they actually read these data A. Sarkar was with the University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 95616 USA. He is now with AT&T Labs, Bedminster, NJ 07921 USA (e-mail: asarkar@ucdavis.edu).
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at certain points of the process timeline in combination with other data via the steps, a privacy breach scenario will arise. In large processes, it is difficult to manually identify which agents are controlling which steps, can read which data, to lead to a privacy attack. Thus, we model a process and a possible attack as directed acyclic graphs with data, steps, agents, filters, and restrictors (see Section IV). The agents in the graphs are all insiders who have different access levels to the collectionoriented data moving in between the steps. Then, DIAS identifies automatically if there are any process steps that can read such data, which, in combination with other data, can give rise to the attack. This is achieved by mapping the attack model onto the process model based on some similarity matching criteria. A successful attack identification is defined in the form of satisfaction of these matching criteria (see Section V). The intuition behind this is these criteria examine whether the process model has the agents that can read certain "normally unutilized" data, which can lead to a successful attack. DIAS can also identify attacks with apparent dissimilarity between the attack and process models. For example, if an attack model step requires reading a vote in an election and a process model has a step that allows a manual reading of the vote, then the attack step can be mapped onto the process step, and hence be successful. This is because the attack model step just needs to read a vote, and irrespective of whether it is manually or machine read, the attack step can be realized through this corresponding process step.
DIAS also identifies agent collusion scenarios. We use logic rules to implement (see Section VI) the attack-model-processmodel similarity matching criteria. These rules generate and test the different possible ways in which an attack model is similar to a process model according to the matching criteria, each corresponding to a way in which the attack can be carried out on the process, thereby identifying the rogue "responsible for attack" agents, too. Section VII presents the results of applying DIAS on election process examples.
DIAS automatically searches for improvement opportunities to eliminate the identified attacks (see Section VIII). The process steps are scanned for improvement opportunities in a descending order of the number of times they are attacked across the different possible ways of attack. This scanning order ensures that a larger number of attack ways are eliminated in the initial rounds of improvements, thereby quickly presenting the user with a more robust process model. We then evaluate our improvements and iteratively exploit the improvement opportunities to ensure that the process is made robust against the attack in all possible ways or in as many possible ways as the improvement opportunities can eliminate. This paper concludes with related work in Section IX and summary of DIAS and future directions in Section X. Thus, given a set of process and attack models, DIAS identifies which attacks may be carried out successfully on which of these processes by which agents in which ways and then makes the processes robust against these attacks.
A major advantage of DIAS is that it provides a formal analysis mechanism to identify and remove vulnerabilities from a process statically, without the actual process needing to be carried out, thereby avoiding the additional time taken for afterthe-fact analyses. Fig. 1 shows a vote-by-email process, which is one of the examples that motivated us to develop DIAS. The oval nodes represent data, the rectangles the steps, and the octagons the agents. Nodes are labeled as id : t, where id is a unique identifier, and t is a type. For example, in Fig. 1 , in the first step, node s1 uniquely identifies the step that has a type of decide_on_vote. We consider a collection-oriented hierarchy where a datum may possess subdata. A step can contain multiple functions (for function semantics, refer to Section IV). In a vote-by-email process, a voter decide_on_vote and write_vote_on_ballot. The ballot is a file, and vote is a marking on that. He also signs, scanning his signature into a file. Write_vote_on_ballot and signing can be parallel activities. The voter then composes and sends an e-mail with his voted ballot and signature files as attachments to the Election Office, where a receiving clerk compares the signature on a roster (a prerecorded registered voters' list) with the e-mail attached signature. A match signifies that the voter is registered, in which case the clerk "approve-marks" the email via the validate_signature step indicating that the attached vote is a valid one. During the validate_signature step, the clerk is not authorized to open the voted ballot attachment. He also removes the voter signature file from the e-mail so that the secret of "who has voted for whom" cannot be inferred by a downstream agent. Let us now consider how a privacy breach attack may occur, as shown in Fig. 2 . The receiving clerk, after getting the e-mail as an output from the send_e-mail step, performs the read_vote step. During this step, he reads the attached voted ballot in the e-mail. Then, he reads the attached voter signature file during the validate_signature step, thereby accomplishing the voter confidentiality breach attack, since now he knows for whom a voter has voted.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Given this example process and attack, can DIAS automatically identify if the agents can successfully carry out this attack on this process? Can it find out how to improve the process to prevent the attack? These are the principal questions that we solve in the following sections. Fig. 3 shows a high-level overview of DIAS. A domain expert defines a set of process and attack models. He picks a process model P and an attack model A i from the respective sets and provides them as inputs to the Generate Attack Maps activity to find out if A i can be carried out against P . A i represents any attack in the stream of attacks A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m making up the attack model set. We use Answer Set Programming (ASP) [5] , [6] , a rule-based declarative programming paradigm, to implement the Generate Attack Maps activity. The implementing program encodes the valid conditions under which an attack is successful and also enumerates all possible ways in which A i can be carried out against P based on those conditions. We denote this set of enumerated attack scenarios as M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M k . If this set is empty, then A i cannot take place on P .
III. HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH OVERVIEW
If nonempty, this set of attack scenarios is input to Improve P , which modifies P to thwart A i . The user selects an improvement method that can be exploited to prevent A i . Improve P then scans and applies (if the opportunity exists) the user-selected improvement method on the steps in P in a descending order, addressing the most attacked step first, followed by the lesser attacked ones. Thus, it is the implementing program that decides the location in P in which the selected improvement opportunity will be exploited. Note that thwarting a specific attack does not ever give rise to another attack, thus preventing an infinite process improvement loop. This is because DIAS uses insertion of model constructs to the process model to mitigate the attack against it, without changing the original process flow. P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q is a set of "improved" process models produced as an output from Improve P , where every set element is a variant of process P with certain attack avenues for A i against it being thwarted. Each variant represents a way by which the same process improvement method can be used in different locations in P to eliminate attack ways. P can contain multiple steps that are attacked the same number of times across the different possible ways of attack, and all or some of them can be exploited for the same improvement method. Thus, a new variant is produced depending on the location of P 's step actually exploited by Improve P . The user then selects a variant, for example, P j , from this improved set, which is then again provided as an input to the Generate Attack Maps program. Generate Attack Maps again runs the ASP rules for attack determination based on the attack conditions to test out if P j is indeed improved against A i . This way, the process improvement and evaluation continues iteratively until P becomes robust against A i in all possible ways or in as many possible ways as the improvement methods can eliminate. Then we can reapply DIAS to check the robustness of the next process selected from the set of process models. Thus, DIAS can be applied to all possible combinations of attackmodel-process-model pairs from the input sets to identify and improve the vulnerable processes.
IV. PROCESS AND ATTACK MODELS Here, we define the syntax and semantics of our graph-based language, modeling processes and attacks. We define process and attack models based on a directed acyclic process graph
and restrictors V Y . E represents the edges in G. A step represents a task, a datum is a knowledge, an agent controls a step, a filter is an add-on activity to a step capable of removing certain data from the datastream, and, finally, a restrictor is also an add-on activity to a step, preventing it from reading certain data. With each
, we might have the set of data types T D = {email, vote}. Note that each particular node has only one type. Types of the same kind for data types T D and step types T S can be arranged into a type hierarchy. Conceptually, a type may be further structured to contain various properties such as a class in object-oriented paradigm [7] . For example, e-mail can have properties as e-mailId and sender. Type hierarchy follows the inheritance concept of object-oriented paradigm [8] .
With Fig. 1 ,
Each datum in G maybe composed of one or more similar or differently typed children subdata. Thus, in Fig. 1 , the parent e-mail datum d10 has a pair of children, i.e., ballot datum d9 and voter_signature datum d8. There can be multiple hierarchical levels in our data model. A datum with zero subdata (see d4 in Fig. 1 ) is an atomic entity. A transparent datum (dashed node) allows read access by a step to all of its subdata. An opaque datum (solid node) restricts the read access to all of its subdata by a step. For example, in Fig. 1 , the send_e-mail step s5 reading the transparent e-mail datum d10 canRead all of its children, i.e., ballot datum d9 and voter_signature datum d8. However, if d10 were solid, then s5 cannot read d9 or d8.
The edges
is the set of read edges signifying that steps consume data. A step requires access to all data that are connected to it via read edges. For example, in Fig. 1 , step s1 of type decide_on_vote reads datum d1 of type ballot. E CR ⊆ V D × V S is the set of canRead edges, signifying that steps have the capability to read data but do not actually read or use them as their inputs while carrying out the process. For example, in Fig. 1 , a canRead edge can be inferred between the step s6 of type validate_signature and the datum d12 of type ballot. For assumptions governing the inference of a canRead edge, refer to Access assumptions in the following. E W ⊆ V S × V D is the set of write edges signifying that steps produce data. A step produces all the data to which it is connected via write edges. For example, in Fig. 1 , step s1 of type decide_on_vote writes datum d2 of type vote. E C ⊆ V T × V S is the set of control edges signifying that agents perform steps. For example, in Fig. 1 , agent ag1 of type voter controls step s1 of type decide_on_vote. E DU ⊆ V D × V D is the set of dependsUpon edges showing which specific output data are functions of which specific input data to a step. The dependsUpon edges (blue) travel opposite to the usual dataflow direction determined by the read and write edges. Thus, in Fig. 1 , datum d2 of type vote depends on datum d1 of type ballot. E CO ⊆ V D × V D is the set of isChildOf edges denoting the parent-child relationship between data. An isChildOf edge in G is modeled as a dotted one between the parent and child data, with the parent on top of the child in the space layout. Thus, the parent datum d10 of type e-mail is connected to its pair of children of types ballot and voter_signature via the isChildOf edges. The edges are undirected, since they do not model any dataflow or dependence relationship. E X ⊆ V F × V S is the set of filter edges denoting that filters remove certain types of data from the datastream, thus preventing them from appearing as outputs, or children on the outputs from the steps with which they are associated. E H ⊆ V Y × V S is the set of restrict edges denoting that restrictors prevent the associated steps to read a datum or a subdatum of a particular type. Unlike filters, restrictors do not remove any data from the process datastream. A path is a sequence of nodes
The data dependence function declarations determine the semantics of G. I denotes the set of all step function identifiers that relate the output data with the input data in G. O = {p, g, d, u} defines the set of types of operations being performed by a data dependence function, indicating the meanings of the data dependence. They are as follows:
1) Pass through (p) denotes that a step function without modifying the input datum, writes it as is, as an output. 2) Generate (g) denotes that a step function produces a new output datum previously nonexistent on the datastream. 3) Delete (d) signifies that a step function removes an input datum from the datastream. 4) Update (u) signifies that a step function changes one or more property values of an input's data type (but not the type itself) to produce an output datum.
We associate labels to dependsUpon edges, which are of the
For example, the step s1 of type decide_on_vote in Fig. 1 has two data dependence functions, i.e., d3 = c1(d1) and d2 = c2(d1). The function c1 has a pass-through semantics, reading datum d1 of type ballot and passing it along the datastream, as an output datum d3 of type ballot. Another function c2 has a generate semantics, reading datum d1 of type ballot and writing datum d2 of type vote. Thus, the label on the dependsUpon edge between d3 and d1 is c1 : p and that on the edge between d2 and d1 is c2 : g. 1 A pass through of a parent datum by a step implies a pass through of all the subdata of that parent datum by that step.
Next, we describe the assumptions governing the inference of a canRead edge in G.
Access Assumptions: A canRead edge is an inferred edge, which follows from the following assumptions.
1) If a step reads a transparent parent datum, then it canRead
all children subdata of that parent. However, a restrictor may prevent read access by a step to a child subdatum that matches its type. Fig. 4 (a) shows an example where Step s can no longer read the datum d2 because of the matching restrictor.
the step s of type Send e-mail reads the transparent parent datum d3 of type e-mail, implying that it canRead all the children data of d3, i.e., d1 of type Voter Signature and d2 of type Ballot. In Fig. 4 (b), a restrictor of type Ballot prevents the step s from reading d2. 2) If a step reads a subdatum in a transparent parent datum, then it can read any other subdatum of that parent datum. However, just like in Access assumption 1, a restrictor may prevent read access by a step to a child subdatum that matches its type. 3) If a step reads a subdatum of a parent datum, then it can read the enclosing parent as well. The intuition follows from the scoping concept in a programming language, where a read access to an inner entity automatically grants a read access to the enclosing outer entity. 4) The isChildOf relation is defined transitively over the set of all data V D in G, thus facilitating the inference of additional canRead edges between a step and the descendants of a transparent datum. Since a step canRead a child only if its parent is transparent, as soon as we encounter an opaque datum in the path made up of data connected by isChildOf edges cutting across the parent-child hierarchical levels of G, we can infer no more canRead edges between the descendants of that opaque node and the step reading the opaque node, or any of its ancestors. For example, in Fig. 4 (a), an additional canRead edge can be inferred between the step s of type Send e-mail and datum d4 of type Vote. The step s reading datum d3 implies that s canRead its descendant d4 as well, and the parent of d4, being transparent, allows for this possibility. 5) A step s canRead a datum d indirectly from the upstream, if all the functions acting on d as input, belonging to all the steps on any path between s and d, only perform a pass through operation on d, or on the parent of d. We define a process model and an attack model as two distinct types of process graphs. The process model is a specification drawn out by the domain experts to achieve a useful goal, whereas the attack model represents a malicious plan sought by the rogue agents via the process model.
Formally, a process model P is a process graph
and E
A H = ∅, since an attack model does not contain any filter and restrictor constructs and, correspondingly, no filter and restrict edges. Henceforth, in all the following figures, we have represented process models as white-colored graphs and attack models as pink-colored graphs.
V. ATTACK SEMANTICS
We now describe a valid attack semantics and determine in how many possible ways an attack can take place on a process.
A. Map Conditions
For an attack A to be successful on a process P , we test if the process model steps have the capability to read and write the data required by the steps of A in order to carry out the attack. In addition, the process agents need to collude if A requires that. All these requirements intuitively reduce to a similarity matching between the corresponding nodes of A and P .
Thus, we define an attack as a mapping relation M between an attack model A and a process model P , i.e., relating nodes in A with nodes in P : M ⊆ V A × V P . An attack map 2 M is said to be well formed if it relates A nodes and P nodes of the same kind, i.e.,
We only consider well-formed mappings in this paper. A well-formed M is valid M if all the following mapping conditions are satisfied. These conditions define when a process model allows an attack to be successfully realized through it, because of the similar nature of the pair of models. is valid, the process step's type being a subtype of the attack step's type. The attack step in this case can be successfully carried out via the process step (similarly reasoned as in Section I).
However, if an attack model step's type is a subtype of the process model step's type, then the mapping between them is valid conditionally, i.e., the attack can succeed only if the process step type allows for the additional condition to be met. The intuition is, as long as the supportive process model step type does not explicitly prohibit the characteristics demanded by an attack model step type, a valid mapping can exist between them with the condition that the attack step's additional requirements must be met.
For an attack to be successful, all of its steps need to be carried out. Thus, all steps in V A S are mapped to some steps in V P S (unless they are part of an attack sequence map, as explained in Condition 4). For all
Condition 2-Inputs Match: An attack model step may need to read certain input data to be successful. Thus, the corresponding process model step must provide for these matching input data. The process model can meet this requirement in two ways: either the process model step actually reads the data (where a read edge exists between the process data and the step) needed by the attack model step to be carried out successfully, or the process model step possesses the capability to read the data (where a canRead edge can be inferred between the process data and the step) needed by the attack model step. The capability of a process step to read a data is governed by the Access assumptions (see Section IV). Thus, for . In addition, the inputs and outputs of s a match the inputs and outputs of s p , respectively. We assume that any process agent can be made rogue; thus, whenever an attack step requires an agent to perform it, the process model can always provide one, and it may not have the same type as that of the attack model agent type, but still be capable of carrying out the required attack step as long as the corresponding step types in the attack and process match.
When agents collude, agent mapping scenarios become nontrivial, as discussed in Section VII-B. Note that, for a valid attack, mapped steps are either part of an attack sequence or are mapped individually.
Note that mapping of the nodes implicitly account for the mapping of the edges from the attack model to the process model to represent a valid attack. This arises due to the preservation of the read and the write edges by M V D , as explained before in Conditions 2 and 3.
B. Multiple Ways of Valid Attack
For a given attack model A, there can be many mapping relations M that relate A to a given process model P . We try to find out all such M , each corresponding to a way in which A can be carried out against P . If there is no M , we infer that P is robust against A in all possible ways. The problem of determining all such M is in essence a search problem: each possible way of mapping attack steps/data to process steps/data must be examined. Each combination is generated and then tested against the requirements of a valid mapping, as explained in Section V-A. Thus, we use a generate and test paradigm to generate all attack mapping possibilities and test the validity of the mapping.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We use DataLog with Disjunction (DLV) [9] , [10] , a stateof-the-art implementation of ASP [6] , [11] , to implement (a selected portion shown here) our valid attack map conditions (see Section V-A).
We encode the constructs in the process and attack models such as step and datum, their types, and the interactions between them as a set of DLV facts. For example, pm_read (d,s) is a process model fact encoding that step s reads datum d. Attack model facts are similarly prefixed with am.
Next, we encode a valid attack on a process implementing mapping Condition 4 in Section V-A. mapsequence(A1,S1,S3,A3,A2,SP,A4):-1 am_sequence(S1,S3), 2 am_connected(S1,S2), 3 am_connected(S2,S3), 4 am_steptype(S2,X), 5 pm_steptype(SP,X), 6 allInMap(A1,S1,A2,SP), 7 allOutMap(S3,A3,SP,A4), 8 not filter_restricts(S2,SP). 9
The preceding DLV rule implements the criteria for an (input data,first step in sequence,last step in sequence,output data) in an attack model, i.e., (A1,S1,S3,A3), to be validly mapped to an (input data,step,output data), i.e., (A2,SP,A4), in the process model (modeled by mapsequence). If an attack model step S2 in a sequence has the same type X as that of a process model step SP, and the data types of all the data input to the first step S1 and output from the last step S3 in the attack sequence match the data types of at least some data input to and output from the process step SP (modeled by the predicates allInMap and allOutMap, respectively), then we can claim that S1 and S3 along with its input to S1 and output from S3 data can be mapped to SP and its input and output data, respectively, signifying that a sequence of attack steps can be successfully realized via a process step. The last conjunct in the aforementioned rule body on line 9 ensures that there is no restrictive filter on SP, which can prevent its output A4 from being the target of the map (filter restriction requirement in Condition 3). A pair of steps are connected (modeled by am_connected) if the former writes a datum that is read by the latter, directly or indirectly (as discussed in Access assumption 5 in Section IV). A pair of connected steps, where the steps are different from each other, form a sequence, as modeled by am_sequence in line 2 of the rule. The allInMap atom implements the condition where a process model step can support an input read requirement by an attack step, either by actually reading the input data or by having the capability to read the input data (see Condition 2 in Section V-A). Similarly, allOutMap supports the output condition (see Condition 3 in Section V-A).
Given an attack and a process model, Generate Attack Maps (see Fig. 3 ) implementation finds out in how many different ways this attack is validly possible on this process based on the attack mapping conditions. This implementation is realized using ASP paradigm, based on stable model semantics [12] , amenable to computationally difficult (e.g., NP-hard) search problems. This implementation is as follows:
inmapsequence(A1,S1,S3,A3,A2,SP,A4) v 1 outmapsequence(A1,S1,S3,A3,A2,SP,A4):-2 mapsequence(A1,S1,S3,A3,A2,SP,A4).
3
Using the aforementioned rule, DLV generates all attack maps or stable models in which all valid attack conditions (as explained in Section V-A) are satisfied. Each attack map corresponds to a way in which an attack can be carried out on a process. Each such map contains inmapsequence atoms denoting that certain entities in the attack model are mapped to those in the process model or outmapsequence atoms denoting that those attack model entities are not mapped.
We feed as input the attack and process models, along with our valid attack conditions (see Section V-A) and rules used for resultant attack map visualization, to the DLV answer set solver implementing Generate Attack Maps. The solver generates a set of attack maps, each showing a way in which all the attack model steps, data (or attack sequence), and agents can be mapped to some process model steps, data, and agents, respectively, as per our valid attack conditions. The model constructs in each of these attack maps get projected onto node atoms and the relations and corresponding mappings among the constructs onto edge atoms of a graph by the visualization logic. Using DLVWrapper [13] , a Java interface for the DLV system, we implement a Java-based method to collect these node and edge atoms and construct a graph in dot format (Section VII shows such program-generated output graphs).
Thus, utilizing the power of the answer set solver DLV, we can implement successful attack semantics and generate all possible ways of attack based on this semantics.
VII. RESULTS
This section shows our results of running Generate Attack Maps implementation (see Section III) on input process and attack models. Section VII-A shows an automatic privacy attack identification, arising due to subtle read capabilities of process steps, in motivating example in Section II. Section VII-B deals with privacy attack identification on a votein-person process, involving agent collusions. Section VII-C shows another inside attack in medical domain. Fig. 3 ) run on our motivating example, demonstrating a voter confidentiality attack where a clerk reads the voted ballot before validating the voter signature, thereby knowing for whom a voter has voted. Fig. 5 shows the result, automatically produced, when we run Generate Attack Maps implementation on our motivating example. The interpretation of the output requires knowledge of the process semantics and domain knowledge and is left to the user. For example, this output can be interpreted as the malicious goal of read_vote along with the nonrogue step of validate_signature in the attack model being realized through the single step of validate_signature in the process model. This is visualized by the pair of red dashed mapping edges from step s7 of type read_vote and step s8 of type valSig (denoting Validate Signature) in the attack model, both terminating in the step s6 of type valSig in the process model. 3 The mapping edge between ag and ag2 in the attack and process models, respectively, identifies the recClerk (receiving clerk) as the rogue agent. The receiving clerk reads the vote on the ballot, which is attached in the e-mail during the read_vote step (s7), and then carries out the valSig step (s8) reading the vsig (denoting voter signature) attachment in the e-mail as well. Thus, a privacy attack has been now realized since the clerk knows for whom the voter has voted. Note that, satisfying Condition 4 in Section V-A, all the inputs to the first step s7 and all the outputs from the last step s8 of the attack sequence are mapped to some inputs and outputs, respectively, of the step s6 in the process model. In the attack model, the step s7 requires to read the vote datum (d20) as one of its input. The process model provides for this requirement via the canRead edge (dashed black edge in Fig. 5 ) between d11 and s6 (satisfying Condition 2 in Section V-A).
A. Can Read Capability Attack
Step s6 in the process model reads the e-mail datum d14, which is a transparent one. As per Access assumption 4, s6 canRead any descendant of the transparent datum d14, as long as there is no opaque datum on the path between d14 and that "read-by" descendant, along the isChildOf edges. The datum d11 is a descendant of d14. In addition, the intermediate datum d12 between d14 and d11 is transparent. Hence, a canRead edge can be inferred between d11 and s6, thereby realizing the attack.
Thus, DIAS automatically identifies attack scenarios where normally unused process data are used by agents in a malicious context leading to a privacy breach. In a nonmalicious scenario, the receiving clerk does not read the vote datum while he is validating the voter signature. However, if he does, a privacy breach occurs.
B. Agent Collusion Attack
The mapping of the agents as described in Condition 5 in Section V-A becomes nontrivial when agents collude. Consider a vote-in-person process (see white graph in Fig. 6 ) where a roster clerk rcl 4 checks a voter's eligibility to vote during the cve (Check Voter Eligibility) step when the voter reaches the polling booth on election day. The clerk verifies whether vid (voter's ID) is present in rl (roster list). If the verification succeeds, rcl tells bcl (the ballot clerk) to give the voter a ballot of a specific type; vev (Voter Eligibility Verification) is an abstract representation of this communication. The voter now gets a blank ballot from bcl via the isb (Issue Ballot) step, on which he fills out his vote, as a child of the ballot, via the fillb (Fills Ballot) step. Now, let us consider that insider agents want to collude, to find out for whom a voter has voted. The pink graph in Fig. 6 shows such a scenario. Once rcl finds out that a voter is eligible to vote, he covertly passes on the vid to bcl. The bcl writes that secret on an empty ballot as a child of it via the wvb (Write Vote on Ballot) step and hands it over to the voter. The unsuspecting voter casts his vote on the ballot, as a child of it, as usual. Thus, we have a ballot with two children subdata, the vid and the vote, thereby breaking the voter's confidentiality. Fig. 6 shows the result of running the Generate Attack Maps implementation on these vote-in-person process and possible privacy breach attack models, automatically identifying how the roster and the ballot clerk can collude to actually realize the attack. The step cve in the attack model along with its inputs and outputs is mapped to its counterpart in the process model (satisfying Conditions 1, 2, and 3 in Section V-A, as shown by the orange mapping edge), whereas the sequence of steps wvb, . . . , isb in the attack model is mapped to the single step of isb in the process model via a pair of red edges (satisfying Condition 4 in Section V-A). In addition, there are mapping edges from rcl and bcl in the attack model to their counterparts in the process model. All these can be interpreted as that the rcl performs the usual step of checking the voter eligibility and the bcl performs the malicious step of writing the vid on the ballot along with the nonrogue step of issuing the ballot to the voter. The attack model requires that the secret vid, which is gained by the rcl via the cve step, needs to be passed onto the bcl. The process model supports this requirement via the dotted green edges between the agents rcl and bcl, which signify that the rcl and the bcl can collude. Thus, through the process step isb, the bcl can perform two activities: it writes the datum vid (as a child on the ballot b) that it canRead from the upstream passed onto him by the rcl (assuming that the step cve does a pass through on vid) and then issues the ballot to the voter. The voter fills out the ballot (as shown by the orange mapping edges between the corresponding steps of fillb in the attack and process models), thereby breaching the voter confidentiality since, now, the same ballot contains the children vid and vote. Fig. 7 shows the application of DIAS in identifying an insider attack in a different context other than elections, i.e., in a medical process domain. The white graph (on the right) shows a medical organizational process where a nurse conducts a test on a patient to produce the test result that is registered in patient file as an electronic record by a record clerk. The pink graph (on the left) shows a possible attack where a rogue record clerk releases the test result obtained from the nurse to an unauthorized third party for monetary benefit, before recording the result in electronic format in the patient file. The horizontal orange and red edges produced by running the Generate Attack Maps implementation automatically identifies the realization of this insider attack. The orange edge mapping step s3 to s1 indicates that the nurse ag1 carries out the usual step of type conduct_test_on_patient, whereas the red edge mapping the attack sequence s4 through s5 to process step s2 indicates that the record clerk ag2 carries out both the malicious step to release_to_third_party the patient's confidential test result and the nonmalicious step to record_in_patient_file that result.
C. Insider Attack in Medical Domain
VIII. PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
After Generate Attack Maps identifies the possible ways in which an attack take place on a process, Improve P (see Fig. 3 ) automatically searches for and applies improvement opportunities in the original process model to prevent the attack from succeeding in any possible way, or as many possible ways as it can eliminate. However, in the course of these improvements, Improve P does not modify the process model in such a way that the original process goal is inhibited. Thus, none of the process steps, agents, or data are deleted or updated in their types during the improvement.
Once improved, the resulting process model is again provided as an input to Generate Attack Map to confirm that the process has been indeed made robust against the concerned attack in different possible ways. It may take multiple improvement iterations before this goal is achieved.
A. Restrictor Addition
Here, we show how restrictors can be added as add-on activities to process steps to prevent attacks. We have used this improvement method to prevent the voter confidentiality attack on vote-by-e-mail process (see Section VII-A). Fig. 8 shows how a vote-by-e-mail process can be improved to prevent the voter confidentiality breach attack. The attack model (see Fig. 5 ) requires the agent ag of type recClerk, carrying out the step s7 of type read_vote, to read datum d20 of type vote. The process model satisfies this requirement via step s6, having the capability to read d11 using the canRead edge. Improve P (see Fig. 3 ) finds an improvement opportunity here, where a restrictor e of type ballot is added as an addon activity to the step s6 of type valSig, as shown in Fig. 8 . The restrictor e prevents s6 from having the capability to read datum d12 of type ballot or any of its descendants. As per the Access assumptions (see Section IV), a step canRead a child subdatum only if its parent is transparent. The restrictor e, by preventing the read access of step s6 to d12, has the effect of making d12 opaque. Thus, s6 cannot read d11, which is a child of d12 (shown by the red cross on the canRead edge between d11 and s6 in Fig. 8) , thereby preventing the map from d20 to d11 (shown by the red cross on the mapping edge), hence failing the attack.
A restrictor addition of type vote to process step s6 would have the same effect as adding a restrictor of type ballot to step s6. The restrictor of type vote would have prevented s6 from having the capability to read any datum of type vote, thereby disallowing the map from d20 to d11, hence failing the attack. This alternative process improvement way through more finegrained data access control is desirable in scenarios where a Fig. 8 . Process improvement example where a restrictor e of type ballot (in the red box) prevents the capability of step validate_signature to read ballot (d12), thereby preventing its capability to read the child vote (d11) as well. Without the canRead edge between d11 and s6, the data mapping from d20 to d11 fails, thereby failing the voter confidentiality attack.
process step reads siblings of the secret (d11) we are trying to prevent the read of. For example, if s6 reads d11's siblings (if present), then adding a restrictor of type ballot to s6 will prevent s6 from reading those siblings as well, hindering the original goal of the process in the first place.
Thus, generalizing, we can say that if we need to prevent a step s from having the capability to read a datum d (s canRead d) in a process, then either we can add a restrictor of type equal to d's type to s or we can add a restrictor of type equal to the type of any ancestor of d to s, provided there is no read edge between that ancestor or any other descendant of that ancestor and s. Note that if a restrictor of type equal to d's type is added to s, then it must be the case that there exists no read edge between d or any descendant of d and s in the process model. Otherwise, the improvement opportunity cannot be applied because it hinders the original goal of the process.
Currently, this "restrictor-addition" improvement method is only conceptualized; in future, we will implement it.
B. Filter Addition
We introduce a second improvement method with filters as add-on activities to process steps, to prevent attacks. This method prevents the voter confidentiality attack on vote-inperson process (see Section VII-B).
Sometimes, an attack model step writes a datum with a child, whereas its counterpart in the process model does not contain any matching child on the corresponding output datum. For example, in the attack model in Fig. 6 , the step isb writes a datum b with a child vid, whereas the output datum b from the corresponding isb step in the process model does not contain any child as vid. Thus, a process improvement opportunity exists, which is utilized by Improve P implementation. Fig. 9 shows the output of Improve P run on the vote-in-person process (see Section VII-B). The implementation of Improve P automatically adds a filter, i.e., vid, on the process step, i.e., isb, as shown within the red box in Fig. 9 . Condition 3 in Section V-A requires that if we can validly map an output datum from an attack model step to that from a process model step, then the attack step's output must not contain a descendant whose type matches the process model step's filter's type. Thus, the addition of the filter of type vid on the step of type isb in the process model will ensure that Condition 3 does not hold. The output datum from the attack step isb can no longer be mapped to the output datum from the process step isb (see red cross in Fig. 9 ) because of this prohibitive filter, thereby failing the attack. The filter prevents the ballot output from step isb to contain the secret vid. Thus, vid does not get carried downstream, where both the children subdata vid and vote can exist on the ballot, thereby preventing the voter confidentiality attack.
IX. RELATED WORK
First, we compare DIAS to the rest of the literature. Then, we explain how DIAS, with respect to our previous work on which it is based upon, advances our research contributions.
A. Comparison With Other Literature 1) Holistic Perspective:
Most security analyses focus on specific parts of a process, rather than taking a holistic view. Kohno et al. [1] have analyzed the source code of voting machines having a significant share in the U.S. market to realize that they do not meet sufficient security standards. Not only are these voting machines vulnerable to insider threats such as vote manipulation, but they are susceptible to simple outsider attacks as well, for example, against attacks over the computer network. Similarly, [14] - [16] have focused on the voting machine technology that is a specific part of the process. Some [17] have put more attention to the cryptographic protocols used for election systems. In contrast to all these approaches, we examine the interactions among agents, steps, and data, i.e., all players in a process rather than analyzing a specific aspect of a process to identify attacks and improve the process.
2) Process-Based Attack Analysis: Osterweil [18] first applied a formal method of process analysis to software development in order to improve the way in which software was developed. Several other models were developed for various uses such as coordination in the workplace, and several languages were developed to enable formal analysis of processes [19] , [20] and applied to domains beyond software development such as health care [21] , [22] and elections. However, none of these approaches focus on identification and prevention of malicious attacks in processes. Wise et al. [20] have used Little-JIL as a graphical formal process programming language for supporting complex coordinations and abstractions in processes. Clarke et al. [21] have used Little-JIL to define a blood transfusion medical process, then applied PROPEL [23] system to elucidate desirable properties that must be adhered to by the process, and then used verifiers (SPIN [24] , FLAVERS [25] , LTSA) to check if the properties are actually respected. Simidchieva et al. [3] have used Little-JIL to define a detailed election process model and then automatically derived a fault tree to identify combination of failures that may allow a selected potential error to occur. All the errors identified by these aforementioned studies in this paragraph are inadvertent mistakes committed by the process agents, whether human or automated. On the other hand, DIAS identifies intentional attacks on a process by rogue agents.
Thus, we see that process-based attack analysis (as against error analysis) of agents, steps, and data in any domain, including elections, is an emerging area of study where a lot of work still needs to be done. Red team tests have performed some work in this area, examining systems both individually and in the context of an election process [26] , [27] , but the latter is being done informally and nonrigorously. Barr et al. [28] pointed out that the security of elections and the accuracy of their results depend just as much upon the processes and procedures followed as upon the technology used. However, they have focused on pointing out the weaknesses of the standards upon which U.S. election processes and voting machine systems are designed and process and system certifications are performed, rather than providing a formal attack analysis mechanism as we do. Weldemariam and Villafiorita [29] - [31] have examined the security of business processes and applied that work to election procedures. They have discussed a formal methodology for assessing the procedural security of an organization. However, unlike our logic-rule-based attack identification approach, they have first encoded the process asset flows in terms of executable specifications using a formal language where there is an allowance for malicious transformation of assets by random execution of one or more threat actions in the model. Then, they have specified the desirable security properties using mathematical formulas that the process needs to satisfy and then have performed a security verification using a model checker to test if the security properties are fulfilled with respect to the threat scenarios in the model.
Ivanova et al. [32] explicitly modeled the behavior of actors, which can be queried to determine the action needed to be performed by the analysis or simulation of a system model. Externalization of actor behavior helps in easier modeling and analysis of different kinds of insider attacks on systems, each time simply replacing the behavior of the insider. Our process or attack model does not currently support conditional action of an agent determined by its behavior, but can be extended via alternation of control flow to achieve the same. Stavrou et al. [33] proposed a model for monitoring insider threats in business processes by evaluating the online behavior of the insiders in social media, their performances at workspace, and the type of business processes they are involved with. This work provides more of a monitoring mechanism by combining external source of information from social media with technical and behavioral patterns to raise insider attack possibility alerts and associated risks, as against identification of different ways of a successful attack on a process based on the ability of the insiders to get access to the right data at the right point of time.
Similarly, Phan et al. [4] have analyzed the security properties of an election process under attack, using model checking. However, unlike DIAS, the concept of agents in their analysis is not explicit; they realized it implicitly via the process steps. In addition, our logic-rule-based approach for determining the criteria for a successful attack is more flexible. By changing our logic rules, we can easily change the definition of a "successful attack," whereas in Phan et al.'s approach, the definition of a successful attack via a process not satisfying an "attack-always-fails" property is somewhat rigid. In addition, their approach, unlike ours, does not provide a method for automated improvement of the process once the attack has been identified.
B. Advancing Our Previous Work
DIAS is based on and extends our previous work of insider attack identification and prevention using a declarative approach [34] . The improvements made by DIAS and their advantages in relation to our previous work are as follows.
1) Our extended model supports multilevel hierarchical parent-child decomposition of data (missing in our previous work), thereby being able to model and analyze a much wider range of real-world processes. 2) Hierarchical data decomposition enables differential data access modeling capability, which helps to identify more subtle privacy attacks. We can now model and identify scenarios where rogue process agents utilize their not-soapparent capabilities to read data across the parent-child hierarchy via the steps leading to privacy attacks. 3) DIAS is simpler and concise, but subsumes all the concepts expressed by our previous model. For example, annotation was a construct in our previous model encoding extra information in a datum. Hierarchical data modeling has replaced its need. A child of a datum is now equivalent to an annotation on a datum. In addition, with annotations, we could not model multilevel data hierarchy. 4) Flexible step type matching in our extended model allows for more attack identification opportunities. A process model step should allow for at least what an attack model step demands, but can provide for more. Thus, if a process step type is a subtype of the attack step type, then the attack step can be realized through the process step. This was disallowed by our previous approach, which needed the attack and process step types to be strictly equal, for a successful attack. 5) DIAS has an enriched semantics expressed by the finegrained data dependence declarations. In our previous model, a process step was a "black box"-it abstracted away the type of operations it performs on the inputs to produce the outputs. In addition, our model did not specify which output from a step depends on which particular input. Our current work expresses those dependence. 6) DIAS introduces process improvement methods such as utilizing restrictors missing in our previous work.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented DIAS, a novel logic-rule-based static analysis approach for automatically determining if an attack can take place on a process and, if so, in how many ways this attack can be performed and who are the rogue insider agents involved. Interesting agent collusion attack scenarios are also demonstrated. Dataflow-based process and attack models are considered, and a holistic perspective is used that looks at steps, data, and agents to determine if a process is vulnerable. DIAS also automatically identifies subtle privacy attacks by rogue insiders on processes having collection-oriented hierarchical data models. The problem of attack determination is essentially reduced to a graph-matching-based search problem. We introduce a graph-based language for modeling the processes and attacks. The language has a natural visual syntax, which provides a simple understanding of how a process and a possible attack on that process may look like. Then, we use a declarative programming paradigm to automatically enumerate the possible ways in which an attack model graph can be matched against a process graph according to a concept of a valid mapping, encoded as logic rules. Each mapping shows a possible attack avenue realizable through the process.
In addition to being intuitive in expressing a valid attack mapping concept and being useful in automatically enumerating attack possibilities, our logic-rule-based approach allows the flexibility to change a successful attack definition easily, by changing the logic rules defining an attack semantics. Once attack possibilities are determined, our Java-based implementation automatically searches and exploits improvement opportunities in the process from the highest to the lesser attacked steps.
DIAS does not automatically generate attacks from a given process model, as achieved by a model checker in current literature [35] . DIAS is complementary to this model checking approach. Once the model checker generates an attack trace that is successful against a process, we can convert that attack trace structure into our format of a dataflow-based attack graph. Then, DIAS can be used to check against which other processes this attack will be successful, as well as in how many different ways the attack is possible.
As a future work, we want to develop additional optimizations for our process improvement procedure. For example, we can associate a metric to every process model step denoting its importance in terms of maintaining the dataflow in achieving the final goal of the process and then improve the process starting from the steps that have the highest value of the metric and are attacked the most number of times. Allowing for loops in process and attack model graphs thereby leading to an identification of a wider range of attacks is also what we want to investigate soon. In addition, in future, we want to apply DIAS on process domains beyond elections such as real estate and medical domains, thereby demonstrating its broader applicability base.
